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1. Introduction 
 
The terrorist attacks in the USA of 9/11 as well as later bombings in Madrid in 2003 
and London in 2005 significantly changed the security landscape on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Stricter and more effective measures to fight the ongoing terrorist activities in 
Europe and in the US have been adopted. This has also had an impact on ensuring 
that those who enter the territory of the United States and the European Union are 
more thoroughly checked before they are admitted to enter the territories of both 
entities. Thus, the counter-terrorist policies have had a significant impact on one 
policy that is crucial in this respect – the visa policy.  
However, the changes in visa policy motivated by the need to ensure increased 
security of borders pose enormous challenges for both the US and the EU.  
The first challenge concerns the internal security aspects of visa issuance. In the 
post-9/11 environment this has become such a dominant imperative of visa policy 
that both the US and the EU have often embarked on new projects without 
sufficiently thinking through other aspects, such as data protection or more generally 
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the human rights issues involved. Both entities launched programmes that entail 
collection of sensitive personal data (including biometric data) concerning travellers 
to the US and the EU, such as US VISIT programme or Visa Information System 
(VIS) in the EU. However the security of these systems as well as the rights of 
persons subject to data retention, including possible abuse, has not been sufficiently 
examined. This poses serious questions about the adequacy of these moves and the 
balance between concerns over internal security and the legitimate rights of visa 
applicants. 
The second main challenge of visa policy on both sides of the Atlantic relates to the 
visa policies as a foreign policy tool. As the main changes adopted in the recent 
years have been so much driven by the internal security considerations, the external 
dimension of visa policy has often been all but forgotten. The fact that the US and the 
EU do not often pay sufficient attention to the impact of visa policy on their relations 
with third countries could seriously damage the ability of both of them to engage the 
governments of these countries to work with them on certain goals, including the fight 
against terrorism, the control of illegal migration flows, organized crime, or even on 
issues that are not ultimately linked to internal security agenda.  
The third main challenge is the effectiveness of visa policy in its current form. More 
stringent visa policies have led to the introduction of new, costly technologies, 
deployment and training of additional staff and reorganisation of consular services in 
both the US and the EU. Still, it is not sure whether these costly measures will 
actually meet the objectives for which they were introduced, i.e. identifying and 
eliminating those who pose a threat for the US or the EU and should not be admitted, 
whilst not deterring or causing indignation to legitimate travellers. The human 
dimension should certainly not be forgotten – the visa procedure often causes 
enormous frustration to applicants, can act as a further deterrent to legitimate free 
movement and hinder intellectual exchange, business and tourism. Therefore, the 
impact of visa policies on individual applicants, particularly certain categories that can 
be most beneficial for the US and the EU needs to be re-examined and reconsidered. 
This paper will try to examine the three challenges identified, by looking at the recent 
developments in both the US and the EU, and strive to analyse them as well as to 
provide some ideas and guidance for the future development of visa policies on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  
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2. General framework of visa policy in the USA and the EU  
 
Before examining more precisely the recent changes in the visa policies of the US 
and the EU, it is necessary to mention briefly the general framework in which the visa 
policy is decided and implemented. Important differences to bear in mind arise from 
the structural differences between the USA and the EU. While the USA is a federal 
state, and visa policymaking is concentrated at a federal level (although implemented 
through various bodies and agencies), in the EU the situation is more complicated, 
due to the shared responsibility for visa policies between the EU and its member 
states. Furthermore EU visa policy is one of so-called “variable geometry”, meaning 
that not all the EU member states participate in the measures adopted under the 
common visa policy or apply it uniformly. Moreover, this paper will be dealing only 
with the policies relating to the issuance of short-term visas, i.e. for stays of up to 90 
days. This is because only short-term visa policies are harmonized at EU level. 
Secondly, the policies of long-term visas are of a substantially different nature and 
scope, as they are much more associated with immigration policies of individual 
countries, and as such are obviously framed by different legal and policy instruments. 
 
In the US, the visa policy is an exclusive competence of the federal bodies. Congress 
enacts legislation relating to visas and gives the executive branch the power to 
implement it. The main stakeholders in the executive implementing the visa policy are 
the Department of State, namely its Bureau of Consular Affairs, which runs 
approximately 211 consulates or consular sections of embassies around the world. 
The legislation enacted after 9/11, however, changed significantly the competences 
in visa policy. Firstly, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which set up the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ascribed important competences to this 
body. On basis of this act, the responsibility of implementing visa policy is shared 
between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State. While 
the former has the right to promulgate regulations governing visa issuance and take 
over responsibility for training of consular officers, the actual issuing of visas is done 
through the aforementioned network of over 200 US consular posts that fall under 
Bureau of Consular affairs at the State Department. Moreover, the DHS has taken 
over additional responsibilities concerning travel to the United States. For instance 
the Homeland Security Act abolished the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and 
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created the new Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) within the 
DHS. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection within the DHS has taken over 
the responsibility for running and monitoring the U.S. points of entry, including 
customs.  
To some extent, the Department of Justice also plays a role in the visa policy, 
especially in determining which countries are eligible for the so-called “visa waiver 
programme”, an assessment which is undertaken jointly with State Department and 
DHS.  
 
In the European Union, visa policy falls within the scope of Title IV of Treaty 
establishing European Community entitled Common Visa, Asylum and Immigration 
Policy. It is a relatively new EU policy which was only incorporated into the EU 
framework by virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam. However, the origins of this policy 
go back to the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and the Schengen Convention of 1990 
which started as the intergovernmental co-operation of five countries outside the EU 
framework2. The call for this common policy is precipitated by the removal of internal 
borders among the contracting states and the creation of an external Schengen 
border, which requires not only common standards for its protection but also common 
criteria of admitting third-country nationals to the Schengen zone. There are, 
however, certain aspects which make the EU visa policy more complex than other 
community policies.  
Firstly, as has already been mentioned, the common visa policy does not apply to all 
EU member states. The United Kingdom and Ireland, on basis their opt-out from 
Schengen acquis, do not participate at the adoption of measures under Title IV of 
TEC which includes visa issues, and these measures are thus not binding on them 
(we refer to this as variable geometry) unless they notify in advance that they want to 
participate at the adoption of certain measures (ad hoc opt-in)3. A similar system 
applies to Denmark, apart from the positive and negative lists of countries requiring 
visas (see further) and uniform format of visas, which are indispensable for the 
implementation of Schengen acquis in which Denmark participates. As to the other 
measures adopted under Title IV TEC, Denmark can, however, unilaterally decide to 
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Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
3 Protocol on the position of UK and Ireland to the Amsterdam Treaty 
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transpose the relevant measures to its domestic legislation which thus becomes 
binding4.  On the contrary, two countries that are not members of the EU, namely 
Norway and Iceland5, apply the Schengen acquis although they have not signed the 
Schengen convention, but have concluded a separate agreement with the Council6. 
Thus they do not participate in measures adopted under common visa policy, but can 
participate at the drafting and formulation of new proposals (through the so-called 
mixed committee). Once adopted, such measures are binding for both of them. A 
similar agreement has recently been concluded with Switzerland, which approved it 
in a referendum on 5 June 2005.  
 
Secondly, the EU enlargement that took place on 1 May 2004 brought in ten more 
countries who are not part of the Schengen zone (i.e. they still have not lifted the 
borders vis-à-vis the other member states); however they already participate in the 
adoption of measures related to the common visa policy. However, most of these 
measures will apply to these countries only once they will become part of the 
Schengen area, which has to be decided unanimously by the Council. To give an 
example, the new member states do not issue Schengen visas but instead their own 
national visas. This means they do not have to charge the standard fee applicable to 
Schengen visas, or they do not have to follow the same procedures for visa issuance 
set forth in the so-called Common Consular Instructions. However, they are already 
bound by some measures of common visa policy, such as e.g. on which third 
countries they must impose visas and on which third countries they may not.  
 
An important difference in EU visa policy relates to the link between the EU-level 
regulation and implementation of visa policy. The legislation relating to common visa 
policy is today exercised either by the Council (e.g. the “positive” and “negative” visa 
lists of third countries or uniform format of visas) or jointly by the Council and 
European Parliament in the so-called “co-decision procedure” (Article 251 TEC) 
concerning the procedures and conditions for issuing visas and rules on uniform 
                                                 
4 Protocol on the position of Denmark to the Amsterdam Treaty 
5 Article 6 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union 
6 Agreement between the Council and Norway and Iceland of 19 December 2006 on their association with the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis 
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visas7. Most of the legislation which is adopted this way is in the form of regulations 
or Council decisions, meaning that it is directly applicable and binding on the EU 
member states and their authorities or on the individual addressees and does not 
have to be transposed into the domestic legislation. However, as far as the 
implementation is concerned, it is carried out by the consular representations of the 
individual member states as there is no diplomatic or consular representation of the 
EU so far. Despite the fact that they are bound by some jointly agreed measures, 
such as the Common Consular Instructions (CCI) and Common Manual (CM), the 
visa issuing practices still differ significantly among different countries. This poses 
serious problems in the implementation of the common visa policy, as will be shown 
in the final part of this study, and leads us back to the fundamental question of the 
effectiveness and purpose of the EU common visa policy.  
 
3. Visa policy as a tool of improving the internal security 
 
Most of the immediate changes relating to visa policy in the US after 9/11 were 
introduced as a response to terrorist attacks, aiming at eliminating the possibility of 
future perpetration. The fact that the 19 terrorists behind the 9/11 attacks acquired 
altogether 23 non-immigrant visas from five different US consulates led the US 
administration to rethink the conditions for issuing visas. A number of legislative and 
executive acts that were subsequently adopted focused on improving the visa 
issuance process and tackling what can be viewed as the main shortfalls in the 
existing system. 
 
It might seem that in the European Union the motives for improving the security 
aspects of visa policies were less motivated by the threats of terrorism. Unlike the 
9/11 attacks, the Madrid and London bombings were plotted not by foreigners who 
got into the EU on basis of short-term visas but by EU nationals or residents. To 
some extent, it might also seem that the EU measures adopted with the aim of 
enhancing certain aspects of the common visa policy were a mere reaction to the 
                                                 
7 Co-decision in these areas applies after the expiration of five years transitional period since the entry in force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, i.e. since 2004 
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measures adopted or under discussion in the US8. This conclusion would perhaps be 
too simplistic. Although the EU policy was to some extent a response to the US one, 
the EU had it own motives and reasons to modify its visa policy. However, there 
seems to be a growing convergence in the EU with the developments in the US, 
albeit the means still remain different. But the internal security aspects of visa policy 
seem to be more and more interlinked with other aspects of EU activities – namely 
police and judicial co-operation under the current third pillar, the fight against illegal 
migration and the ever more closely aligning asylum policy of EU member states.  
 
 
 
3.1. Impact of 9/11 on US visa issuance – tightened clearance 
procedures and deployment of biometrics 
 
The concerns over the security of visa issuing procedures marked some important 
changes in the US regulation and practice of US consulates abroad. A more 
thorough process of examining the visa application could be encountered in the post 
9/11 environment, with the introduction of compulsory interviews, collection of 
additional data on certain categories of visa applicants and tighter conditions for 
clearing the applications, especially through additional checks with different federal 
agencies and their databases. The need to tighten the system was primarily justified 
by the investigations leading to the 9/11 attacks. The Government Accounting Office 
found out that at least 13 out of 15 hijackers from Saudi Arabia never filled in their 
visa application properly, were never interviewed by US consular officials and three 
of them received the visa under the “Visa Express” programme which has since been  
abandoned9. 
 
As a response, the State Department introduced compulsory interviews by a 
regulation issued in July 2003 which is estimated to concern about 90% of all visa 
                                                 
8 As an example we can cite the US Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, introducing 
certain technical requirements for travel documents issues by countries in the so-called “Visa Waiver 
Programme” (VWP), most of which are EU member states, as a condition for continued participation in the 
programme (also see further).   
9 Stanley Mailman, Stephen Yale-Loehr: Visa Worries, Visa Delays. New York Law Journal, 2003 
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applicants, particularly in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America10. The consular 
staff now performs name checks through the so-called “CLASS database” (Consular 
Lookout Support System). The amount of data contained in CLASS has increased 
significantly over the past years – while in 2000, CLASS contained about 6.1 million 
sets of data collected from different agencies, after 9/11 the State Department has 
added over 7.3 million new sets of data into the system, most of it information taken 
from other agencies, especially FBI11. Most of this additional data was entered from 
NCIC (National Crime Information Center) which is a computerised criminal justice 
database maintained by FBI, containing records of persons, and which the State 
Department and immigration authorities are authorised to access on basis of the US 
Patriot Act. Similarly, 73,000 new records were entered from the TIPOFF12 database 
containing records of suspected terrorist, significantly more than the 48,000 records 
prior to 9/1113. Apart from this, the consular officers are entitled to further security 
checks and consultations with federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, 
known as security advisory opinions (SAO).  
 
Further US administration concerns over the visa issuing process are demonstrated 
by the introduction of supplementary forms (the so-called DS-157) form which has to 
be compiled by all male applicants for US-visas aged between 16 and 45 and in the 
case of some countries (the so-called “T-7 countries”14) by all the applicants. Based 
on the information provided in this form, further extensive name security checks may 
be performed, known as the “Visa Condor” check. This check is based on classified 
criteria which are not disclosed.  However, it is assumed that they are performed for 
nationals of the high-risk countries (i.e. countries designated as states sponsoring 
terrorism or in other ways posing a threat to US security)15 or on basis of other 
criteria revealed in DS-157 form, such as performance of military service in certain 
                                                 
10 Ibid 
11 Testimony of Janice L. Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, Department of State, before the 
House Committee on Small Business, June 4, 2003. 
12 TIPOFF is a database established in 1987 and run by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State 
Department and used as a clearing centre for sensitive information obtained from different federal agencies, 
especially on terrorist. J. Carafano and H. Nguyen: Better Intelligence Sharing for Visa Issuance and Monitoring: 
An Imperative for Homeland Security. Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 27 October 2003 
13 Ibid Testimony of Janice L. Jacobs 
14 These countries are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria and they are designated as states 
sponsoring terrorism  
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countries, or unexplained travel to predominantly Muslim countries over past 10 
years.   As a result of this, the clearance of the whole application process takes 
substantially longer than a standard application procedure16. Previously, the consular 
authorities were entitled to assume that if there were no objections raised within 30 
days, the visa could be issued. The system now has to work on the basis of 
affirmative clearance from the agencies that are consulted on the application. An 
additional scrutiny was introduced for applicants from Saudi Arabia, as part of the so-
called “Visa Security Program”, which requires each application to be reviewed by a 
Homeland Security official.  
 
Additional clearance procedures involve VISA Mantis covering individuals who 
engage in business or research in one of the fields identified in the State 
Department’s Technology Alert List (TAL). This list is very comprehensive and 
includes areas such as biochemistry, immunology, pharmacology, chemical 
engineering etc., i.e. technologies which are suspected of potential “dual use” or 
which can be used in military industry. Although this is not a new procedure, having 
been originally set-up mainly with the view of protecting intellectual property rights, 
after 9/11 it has been expanded so that any researcher or academic involved in any 
of the fields placed on TAL is likely to be required to undergo this check17 with the 
aim of preventing possible leaks of sensitive technologies from the United States.  
 
However, arguably the most important shift in the US visa policy after 9/11 consists in 
the enrolment of biometric data taken from the visa applicants upon submission of 
visa application. The US Patriot Act, adopted almost immediately after the 9/11 
attacks, authorized the Secretary of State and Attorney General to develop a system 
of identification of visa applicants through the use of biometric identifiers18. This trend 
is further reiterated in the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, 
where Congress mandated the administration to deploy biometrics in US issued 
visas. Therefore, two digitalised images of fingerprints and a digital photograph from 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 T-7 countries plus Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon,  Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,  Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen. 
16 According to State Department, 80% of the Visa Condor checks are cleared within 30 days  
17 Peng and Weber: Security Checks for Non-Immigrant Visa Processing 
18 System enabling identification of a person through biological characteristics, such as facial features, 
fingerprints, iris etc.  
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each visa applicant are taken by consular officials upon the receipt of a visa 
application at US consulates all around the world before the visa application is 
processed. The purpose is to enable the data to be transmitted to the Department of 
Homeland Security to check the biometric data against the so-called IDENT19 
database.  When a “hit” on the data is performed, it means that the consular office 
cannot issue a visa until a further check is performed and the application finally 
cleared by consular official. The biometric information on visa applicants, however, is 
not contained on the visa as such (for instance, in a form of chip). It is only entered 
into the database which is then made available to the immigration officials at US 
ports of entry when it is checked again. However, as the biometric information is not 
contained in the visa itself, it has to be taken again by the immigration authorities 
upon arrival in the United States who compare it with the information entered in the 
database by the respective consular officials at the US consulates which issued the 
visas.  
 
The collection of biometric identifiers gained particular salience not only in connection 
with the aforesaid enrolment of biometric data at US consulates abroad but with the 
creation of an integrated entry-exit system tracking all the arrivals and departures in 
the United States, known as US-VISIT program.20 The introduction of this programme 
was envisaged already in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 but further developed 
by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. On basis of this 
programme, the biometric identifiers are collected from all the non-immigrant third 
country nationals entering the United States, including those who do not need the 
short-term (up to 90-day) visas21 under the so-called “Visa Waiver Program” (VWP) 
although for the nationals of these countries the obligation to enrol in the US-VISIT 
programme was extended only at a later stage. This biometric data, including other 
data available on the visitors (such as alphanumeric data detectable from the 
passports) is then compared with various databases to which the ports of entry to US 
                                                 
19 Automated Biometric Identification System. It contains biometric data of number of individuals wanted for 
investigation, apprehension, detention etc. for the breach of US immigration rules, persons wanted by other law 
enforcement agencies, citizens of countries that wage war against the US etc. For details see DHS/ICE-CBP-
CIS-001. Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 239 
20 Abbreviated version of U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Technology Programme 
21 Applicable to citizens of 27 countries of the Visa Waiver Programme. Nationals of these countries can enter 
the US for up to 90 days for business or leisure without a valid visa  
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are connected and which enable them to check whether someone should be 
admitted to the territory of United States22.   
 
3.2. European Union – different motives but moving in the same 
direction? 
 
The European Union visa procedures did not seem to be affected by the 9/11 events 
to such an extent. No immediate tightening of visa issuance procedures as a 
response to terrorist attacks was introduced, and the efforts seemed to concentrate 
more on the improvement of co-operation among the law enforcement authorities and 
courts of the member states. However, the fact that measures relating to EU common 
visa policy had already been shifted to the first pillar of the EU by virtue of Treaty of 
Amsterdam, making this policy less intergovernmental than other internal security 
measures, seems to suggest that we will see more EU regulation in this area in the 
future.  
 
In one respect it might seem that the EU has embarked on a similar boat, because 
like the USA it took the first steps towards creating a central database of visa 
applicants for the EU, known as the Visa Information System (VIS). However, the 
motives for the EU to take this step were rather different. In the US the information 
collected from visa applicants is, in a long run, associated with stricter border control, 
admissibility and immigration in the United States, through processing the data 
collected from visa applicants in the US-VISIT programme. No such programme of 
entry-exit registration of third-country nationals arriving in the European Union (or 
more precisely in the Schengen area) exists, nor has one been proposed, although it 
has been recently surfaced again in the Commission Communication on 
interoperability of databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The reason why 
it was ruled out was fear of excessive encroachment on data privacy rights, which is 
something to be discussed later.  
 
The primary reason for creating the aforesaid database of visa applicants and data 
pertinent to them is to improve the exchange of information between the consular 
                                                 
22 The data collected under the US-VISIT programme are cleared e.g. with IDENT (Automated Biometric 
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offices of individual EU member states which are responsible for issuing short-term 
visas (Schengen visas). This proved a clear necessity because the short-term 
Schengen visas entitle their bearer to move freely within the whole Schengen area. 
Thus, the member state issuing the Schengen visa bears the primary responsibility 
for admitting a person to the EU. However, the explanation given by the European 
Commission23 in the explanatory memorandum to the proposal for regulation of VIS 
currently doing through the legislative process would suggest that the scope of the 
proposed system would go beyond mere exchange of information among the 
member states´ consular offices. According to the Commission, the aim of VIS is to 
“...improve administration of common visa policy, the consular co-operation and ... in 
order to prevent threats to internal security and visa shopping, to facilitate the fight 
against fraud and checks at external borders checkpoints..., to assist in the 
identification and return of illegal immigrants and to facilitate the application of the 
Dublin II Regulation...”. The contribution to internal security of member states and 
combating terrorism is also highlighted in the Council Conclusions of 19 February 
2004. This would suggest that the motives behind creating VIS go far beyond a mere 
improvement in the sharing of data among member states consular offices but that 
VIS is really designed to be a multi-purpose tool. Given the very dynamic 
developments in the area of Justice and Home Affairs in recent years and due to 
many initiatives currently considered or on the table, the Visa Information System will 
become one of the tools used for other policies such as enhanced police and judicial 
co-operation, examination of asylum applications or identification and return of illegal 
migrants. This can have some repercussions which will be further considered in the 
third section of this chapter.  
 
The data to be stored in the VIS contain alphanumeric data obtained from current 
visa applications as well as biometric data, namely the digital photographs and 
fingerprints (all ten). This would make the VIS potentially the largest database 
containing biometric data in the world24. However, unlike in the US, where the US 
VISIT programme has been running already since 2003, the Visa Information System 
                                                                                                                                                        
Identification System) or TECS (Treasury Enforcement Communications System)  
23 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal of Regulation on the Visa Information System (VIS) and 
the Exchange of Data Among Member States on Short-Stay Visas 
24 EU data protection working party estimates that the VIS central database would contain 70 million examples 
of fingerprint data within five years from the start of its operation  
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is still only in the making. Although it has already been set up by the aforementioned 
Council Decision, the implementing measures such as the Regulation covering its 
operation are still in the legislative process, as well as other measures needed to 
enable the operation of VIS, such as the amendment of the Common Consular 
Instructions, where the proposal was tabled by the European Commission only at the 
end of May 2006.  
 
There are several practical problems which at the moment raise serious doubts about 
the concept of enrolment of data in VIS, particularly connected to the collection of 
biometrics. Obviously it would be extremely costly if every single EU member state 
were to have the necessary technical equipment in each consular location, because 
of their large number. Exactly for this reason the Commission proposed in the 
amendments to Common Consular Instructions new models of organising co-
operation among EU consulates by using one of the following models:  
• Co-location: meaning that one EU member state representation provides 
technical equipment to staff of other EU member state(s) in its premises. The 
actual receipt of application, including the biometric data of applicants, is thus 
undertaken by different member states officials in one location, using the 
equipment of the host member state. 
• Common Application Centres mean joint pooling of staff from different EU 
member state representations who jointly work and accept applications, 
including the collection of biometric data 
• Co-operation with External Service Providers, which includes the possibility of 
outsourcing the receipt of visa applications, including the capturing of 
biometrics, to an external agency.  
 
Although this initiative was long awaited and is to be welcome, the question remains 
whether it goes far enough. It will be useful in terms of sharing costs relating to 
technical equipment, as well as making things easier for many applicants in different 
locations. But it would not be saving enough in terms of human resources, as the 
member states will be still responsible for accepting and handling “their” applications. 
For this matter, the only long-term solution would be to have genuine EU/Schengen 
visa application centres. They would be handled by EU officials who will examine the 
applications for short-term Schengen visas under the same, firmly-set conditions and 
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would enable a uniform application of the visa issuance process. However, such 
ideas are still a long way from reality as visa issuance is still regarded as one of the 
ultimate expressions of national sovereignty and member states like to keep control 
over it. What could, however, be considered by some member states is using the 
framework of enhanced co-operation in the existing EU treaties to set up joint 
application centres where uniform visas will be processed by consular officials pooled 
from the diplomatic representations of closely co-operating EU members. For 
instance the Nordic countries´ representations work closely in many locations and 
even share premises. Where there is a long-standing and established good 
relationship and a high level of trust in the work of the other representations, this 
model might offer extensive economies of scale as well as making the procedure 
much easier for applicants, but the political feasibility of such move would still have to 
be examined and worked on.   
 
As concerns the biometric data collected on visa applications, the EU decided to go 
even further than the United States. As has been mentioned, in the US visa issuing 
process the biometric information is solely entered into the database made later 
available to the US immigration authorities who can access it in order to verify the 
authenticity of the visa presented by the bearer. The EU intended to increase the 
security of visas by incorporating the biometric data right on the visa sticker. 
However, the solution tabled by the Commission in 2003 and examined by the Visa 
Working Party proved not to be technically feasible. One possibility suggested by the 
Commission would have entailed inserting contactless chips on the visa sticker.  
However, the insertion of more chips in one passport (e.g. subsequent visas issued 
by different EU states, or other states that might want to insert biometrics into visa 
sticker) could lead to the so-called “collision” problems, with the reading device 
unable to identify the valid chip. Similar problems can occur if the passport itself 
already contains biometric information (ePassport)25, due to the negative interaction 
of the passport and the visa chips. There seem to be only two other solutions to this 
                                                 
25 The EU member states will introduce passport containing biometric information of passport bearers on basis 
of Council Regulation 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States. The US also introduced a programme for ePassports 
by the end of 2005 according to State Department.  
 15
problem at the moment26. One would be to store the biometric data on a separate 
“Visa smart card”. But this could lead to problems if the smart card is lost or forgotten 
by the passport bearer. Secondly, it would be difficult to verify that the holder of the 
passport carrying the visa sticker and the holder of the smart card are identical, if the 
passport does not contain the biometric data itself. Thirdly, the cost of devising a new 
system of issuing smart cards in all the EU consular locations (even if the Common 
Application Centres are put in place) would surely be very costly and could not be 
implemented within a short period of time. Therefore, the only solution would be to 
store the biometric information on the visa bearer in the VIS and re-take it from the 
applicants at the ports of entry of the EU, which is very similar to the way US-VISIT 
programme works at the moment. But no doubt this would equally be very costly and, 
in fact, the Commission has not provided any calculations as to the possible costs 
entailed. It is doubtful whether the EU member states are able to equip all the ports of 
entry with necessary tools to take biometrics and to train a sufficient number of staff. 
And if this is currently the only feasible solution and it cannot be implemented, the 
question arises whether the enrolment of biometrics in visa issuing process is 
necessary at all, especially given the fact that the consular officials already have 
access to other JHA databases, particularly the Schengen Information System (SIS). 
It can certainly be argued that this data could also be used for other purposes, but 
this poses serious problems concerning the purpose limitation of setting up a new 
database. Assuring a high degree of security in visa issuance was undoubtedly the 
driving force behind the development of VIS. However, if the state of technology or 
the lack of resources makes it impossible to deploy this process, then it might seem 
that the EU has gone ahead in the mistaken belief that feasible solutions would be 
available to problems.. It would seem disproportionate to store such sensitive 
information in a huge database without being able to process it further and exploit it 
for the purposes for which it was intended.  
 
3.3. Interoperability with other databases in visa issuance process –
implications for data protection issues 
 
                                                 
26 One more option discussed by the Visa working group included having biometric data of the visa bearer stored 
on a 2-D-bar code right on the visa sticker. This option was generally ruled out as too complex and time 
consuming 
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Although the motives behind the measures introduced are supposed to lead to 
increased security of visa issuing and verification processes, the fact that they create 
huge databases with a lot of sensitive information contained therein poses serious 
questions relating to the security of data kept this way, and the right of those data 
subjects to their protection. This involves access by other authorities which might use 
this data for other purposes, sharing the data with other bodies and agencies (what is 
referred to as “interoperability”), with the possibility of misuse of this data, which 
could range from go processing this data, breach of the permitted period of retention 
or even “identity” theft etc. Also, as the databases grow in size, the probability of 
misuse of the data increases, as the feasibility study on VIS suggests.27 The system 
therefore has to pay a particular attention to ensure that all the relevant data 
protection regulations are fully respected, and perhaps even enhanced.  
 
The data protection of visa applicants highlights some different approaches and even 
controversies between the EU and US. As the recent disagreement on the obligation 
of air carriers to communicate passenger data has shown28, these two entities might 
adopt a somewhat different approach to the balance between the use of data stored 
for internal security purposes and the rights of subjects whose data is being collected 
and processed.  
 
It has already been mentioned that VIS will potentially become the largest database 
containing as much as 70 million set of alphanumeric and biometric data in a five 
year period, with the capacity of as many as 100 million sets of data. As with all other 
community regulations, the proposed legislation will have to comply with the 
applicable data protection legal instruments, namely Article 8 of European 
Convention on Human Rights as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights 
and European Court of Justice, and Directive 95/46/EC. Some concerns particularly 
regarding the access of other law enforcement authorities to VIS, its interoperability 
with other European databases, the nature of information stored and the security of 
this information can be raised in relation to the proposed system.  
                                                 
27 Visa Information System (VIS), Final Report, April 2003,Trasys for the European Commission. 
 
28 The agreement struck in 2004 between the EU and US obliges the carriers operating flights from the EU to the 
US to communicate the personal data on passengers to US authorities. The deal was annulled by the European 
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The proposal for VIS regulation currently in the legislative process assumes that 
access to the database will be given for multiple purposes (i.e. the improvement of 
the common visa policy) and to other authorities than consular offices issuing visas. 
This raises questions whether the access to database will fulfil the criteria set out in 
the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which declares the purpose limitation as 
one of the basic principles of collecting and processing data in the EU framework. It 
can be assumed that the aim of creating it is to improve the administration of the 
common visa policy, consular co-operation and consultation between central 
consular authorities. However, it is proposed that VIS could be accessed, for 
example, by authorities processing asylum applications in order to help them in 
determining whether an asylum seeker has previously received a Schengen visa 
(one of the criteria for determining the member state responsible for processing the 
application) or to get supplementary information that could help in assessing the 
credibility of the applicant’s claim. It will also be necessary to grant access to VIS to 
authorities responsible for the control of the external Schengen border which is 
envisaged in the Commission proposal29. As has been suggested, checking the 
biometric information at the EU ports of entry with the information entered in VIS at 
the time of issuing the visas is probably the only technically feasible solution of 
deploying the data contained in VIS, as the biometric data cannot be currently 
contained in visa itself. In this respect, the access of border protection authorities 
would satisfy the purpose limitation principle because it is inherent in the purpose of 
the common visa policy. The same would apply to the checks performed within the 
territory of the Schengen member states once the third country national has entered, 
as this might make it possible to identify breach of visa regime (e.g. overstay), which 
is also inherent to the purpose of the common visa policy.  
 
However, concerns might arise with the possibility of access to VIS by other law 
enforcement authorities or even intelligence services. The Council called on the 
Commission to prepare an ad hoc proposal under Title VI of TEU to grant such 
access for the purpose of prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences 
                                                                                                                                                        
Court of Justice on May 30, 2006, whilst keeping the transitional period of 4 months to prevent the disruption of 
air travel across the Atlantic. For details see e.g. http://www.nytimes.com/iht/2006/05/30/world/30cnd-air.html 
29 Article 16 of the Proposal for Regulation COM(2004) 835 
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and terrorist acts30. The Commission itself argued, in its communication on 
interoperability of databases in the field of Justice and Home Affairs31, for the need 
for other law enforcement authorities to have access to the database. The 
requirement of a specific legal instrument arises from the fact that the co-operation of 
law enforcement and intelligence services in fighting terrorism or serious criminality 
currently falls under the third pillar, while VIS is a community database created on 
basis of Title IV TEC (common visa policy). The purpose limitation principle inscribed 
in the EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data (95/46/EC) requires that data 
be collected and processed only for a specific purpose, which in this case is the 
improvement of the common visa policy. Therefore granting en bloc access by law 
enforcement authorities to VIS would seem a clear violation of the purpose limitation 
principle. Such is the opinion of the EU Data Protection Working Party32, as well as 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)33, who hold that such unlimited access 
would go beyond what may be considered as a “necessary measure in a democratic 
society”34. According to both Working Party and EDPS, access by other authorities, 
such as law enforcement bodies, can only be legitimate on an ad hoc basis, in 
specific circumstances and subject to appropriate safeguards. The conditions under 
which the authorities responsible for internal security can have access to VIS 
therefore have to be very precisely defined35.  
 
The picture would look quite different if we considered the access to data collected 
from US visa applicants and US visitors generally (as the biometric data is collected 
from all the non-immigrant visitors to the US, including the citizens of visa waiver 
                                                 
30 Council Conclusions of 7 March 2005 
31 COM(2005) 597. In this communication, the Commission explores the possibility of interoperability of the 
three systems currently existing or under development in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. These databases 
are Visa Information System (VIS), SIS II (second generation Schengen Information System), containing 
information on “alerted persons” and stolen/missing vehicles, and EURODAC (biometric database of asylum 
seekers aimed at determining the member state responsible for asylum application processing and identifying 
illegal migrants) 
32 This working party was set up under Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC and is an independent European 
advisory body on data protection and privacy (for this reason it is sometimes referred to as Article 29 Data 
Protection Party) 
33 See the Opinion of European Data Protection Supervisor on access of law enforcement authorities and 
EUROPOL to VIS 
34 Opinion on the Proposal for a Regulation concerning the Visa Information System by Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, 1022/05/EN, WP 110 
35 In the Proposal for the Council decision (COM(2005) 600 final of 24 November 2005) concerning access for 
consultation of the VIS it is suggested that the access is given by authorities only for the purpose of preventing, 
detecting or investigating serious crimes and terrorist offences, must be substantiated in every case and there 
must be serious grounds to believe that access to the database will actually help these goals 
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countries). This is because the purpose limitation of the US VISIT database (which 
interlinks data contained in different databases maintained by different agencies) is 
not covered by such strict data protection rules as in the EU. Firstly, there is no 
overarching US legislation ensuring the data protection except for the Privacy Act of 
1974 which, however, applies only to US citizens. The different approach of the US 
and the EU to data protection has been demonstrated on many different occasions, 
including the recent row over the condition to communicate passenger data of EU 
flights to US authorities or the fact that the US has not been recognized by the 
Commission as a country with sufficient data protection. However, the non-immigrant 
foreigners have very little leverage over the personal information concerning them, in 
terms of access to information and possible remedies.  
 
Although US VISIT was originally created for the purpose of verification of visas that 
include biometrics36 (thus, one might think, for a similar purpose as VIS), the data is 
used for a variety of other purposes. The range of subjects and agencies having 
routine access to the data contained in databases integrating data collected on US-
VISIT (such as ADIS, TECS and IDENT) is very wide and not clear-cut and specific37. 
Moreover, it is estimated that gradual implementation of US VISIT will make it 
possible to interface the existing 19 databases. Information available on estimated 20 
million US visa applicants has already been made available to different law 
enforcement agencies and investigators across the country38.  
The purpose for which this information can be used is defined so widely that it would 
be almost impossible to determine what the original reason for collecting the data 
was – these include national security, law enforcement, immigration control and other 
“mission-relating functions”. Certainly, if one is to assume that the original motive was 
to help to identify likely terrorist perpetrators or persons who could otherwise pose 
                                                 
36 Privacy International: The Enhanced US Border Surveillance System – An Assessment of the Implications of 
US-VISIT, pg. 7 
37 The personal information collected and maintained by US-VISIT Increment 1 will be accessed principally by 
employees of DHS components—Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the Transportation Security Administration–and by consular officers 
of the Department of State. Additionally, the information may be shared with other law enforcement agencies at 
the federal, state, local, foreign, or tribal level, who, in accordance with their responsibilities, are lawfully 
engaged in collecting law enforcement intelligence information (whether civil or criminal) and/or investigating, 
prosecuting, enforcing, or implementing civil and/or criminal laws, related rules, regulations, or orders. US-
VISIT Privacy Impact Assessment, Increment 1, Department of Homeland Security  
38 Privacy International: The Enhanced US Border Surveillance System – An Assessment of the Implications of 
US-VISIT 
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threat to US security, today the system is used for a much wider purpose, nothing 
less than the comprehensive surveillance of immigration law and status of foreigners 
in the United States.  
 
Another concern arising out of the creation of enormous databases, such as VIS or 
US VISIT, is connected to the security of data, particularly biometric identifiers. For 
instance, the amendment of Common Consular Instructions as mentioned gives the 
member state representations a possibility to outsource the collection of biometrics to 
external service provider. Thus the risk of data being misused is rapidly increasing, 
including the possibility of “identity theft”. Although the proposal sets quite strict 
criteria for the external service provider to fulfil, it begs a question whether the 
member state representations will be able to exercise sufficient control over the way 
such sensitive data is collected, if this process is outsourced. As regards the 
processing of the data enrolled, Article 29 WP also recommended that the date be 
encrypted, in order to prevent misuse by unauthorised persons during transmission 
through the VIS or when stored on a chip. But technology is so advanced that it is 
impossible to eliminate the risk of biometric data being misused, as demonstrated by 
some recent studies39. At the same time, it is doubtful whether the technology is 
advanced enough to represent a 100% accurate tool of identification, especially as 
the problem will grow bigger as the databases containing biometric information 
increase in size, and the probability of mismatches will increase. This could lead to 
more cases of third country nationals being wrongly identified and unlawfully returned 
or refused admittance. What is even more alarming is that by interconnecting 
different databases, innocent individuals might be – because of wrong identification – 
suspected of criminal activities and to that end arrested, searched or interrogated. 
This poses challenges particularly for the US, as the absence of purpose limitation 
gives grounds for wide-ranging access of law enforcement agencies to access 
different interoperable databases.  
 
The right of the data subjects, (i.e. persons about whom the data is collected, stored, 
and processed) to rectify this data, by demanding its correction or deletion, seems 
                                                 
39 See e.g. the Statement of Barry Steinhardt of American Civil Liberties Union at the Congressional Hearing 
before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy and Commerce, 14 July 2004 (available at 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-60594) 
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therefore an important element in ensuring the accuracy of the information contained 
in the databases. In the case of the VIS all data subjects are guaranteed this kind of 
access, and it extends not only to the visa applicants themselves, but also to persons 
providing invitations or offering guarantees for visa applicants in the form of invitation, 
accommodation or sponsorship letters. However, due to the lack of harmonisation at 
EU level, the potential remedies including possibility of administrative appeal or 
judicial review are still regulated by national legislation which may vary from country 
to country. In this respect, the authorities of the member state responsible to which 
the complaints are addressed are obliged to instruct the data subjects on available 
remedies, including access to courts. However, in terms of ensuring that the rights of 
visa applicants are duly taken into account, it would be desirable for member states 
to agree at least on some minimum standards for visa applicants giving them a right 
to redress in respect of information which is then shared between different authorities 
in different EU countries.   
 
4. External dimension of visa policy – helping to 
accomplish foreign policy objectives or ad hoc decisions 
based on pragmatic choices and trade offs? 
 
Much of what has been discussed so far relates to the internal security aspects of 
visa policies. As has been explained, the concerns over increased security of visa 
issuance and better use of information provided by visa applicants has been the 
driving force behind most of the changes recently introduced. However, one point 
that certainly should not be forgotten is that visa policy still bears an important 
implication for the foreign policies of both the EU and the US, if not an increasing 
one. All in all, one must not forget that visa policy, both in the EU and US, is primarily 
implemented through their foreign and diplomatic services, either the State 
Department or the EU foreign ministries which direct and manage their diplomatic 
representations in third countries.  
 
The concept underlying the foreign dimension of visa policy both in the US and in the 
EU is the differentiation principle. Both the EU and the US have developed systems 
by virtue of which citizens of certain countries are exempt from visa requirement for 
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short-stay visas, in both cases up to 3 months. Countries exempt from visa 
requirement receive privileged treatment, sending a signal that beneficiary countries 
are considered to be more trustworthy than others and this may have a significant 
impact on bilateral relations. However, even for the countries whose citizens do 
require visas for both the EU and the US, the differentiation goes further as different 
clearance procedures are often introduced, either formally or informally, depending 
on the country concerned, as has been demonstrated in the application of the Visa 
Condor procedure for granting US visas to citizens from certain countries. In this 
sense, much depends on the internal regulations within the State Department or the 
foreign service of EU countries, as well as on an established practice in each 
consular location.  
 
4.1. Visa Waiver Programme of the United States – balancing 
internal security considerations with foreign policy objectives 
 
In the United States, differentiation is based on the so-called “Visa Waiver 
Programme” (VWP). This was firstly launched in 1986 as a pilot programme lifting the 
short-term (or the so-called “non-immigrant”) visa obligation for certain countries, 
considered as allies, to facilitate travel and business links. The primary motive behind 
this initiative was thus to improve relations of the United States with certain countries, 
and to certain extent to “reward” them for close relations with the US (the first 
countries placed on the VWP were the UK and Japan). There are other motives and 
explanations, however – for instance eliminating the visa procedures for what is 
considered to be low risk countries, resources can be reallocated to other consular 
posts where the visa issuance requires the application of a higher threshold. In 2000 
the VWP was enacted as a permanent programme by Congressional legislation40.  
 
This enactment also sets out the conditions that a country must meet in order to 
qualify for inclusion in the programme, as well as the procedures how a country can 
be nominated to be enrolled on it. These conditions are a mix of criteria set by the 
                                                 
40 Visa Waiver Permanent Programme Act, 2000. Currently there are 27 countries participating in the Visa 
Waiver Programme: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK  
 23
State, Justice and Homeland Security Departments and are also jointly evaluated by 
them. The basic criteria include a non-immigrant refusal rate for visa applicants of 
less than 3% for the previous two years, issuing machine-readable passports 
(recently also requiring a programme to include biometric identifiers) and offering 
reciprocal privileges for US citizens. Furthermore, the Justice and Homeland Security 
Departments evaluate additional considerations, such as the security of issuing 
passports and visas (including reports of stolen blank passports to US authorities), 
the effectiveness of the country’s law enforcement and immigration practices, co-
operation with the US authorities on law enforcement, extradition and readmission 
issues, and anti-terrorist practices. The in-depth investigation includes the evaluation 
of the overall political and economic stability of a given country and the security of its 
border controls. Enrolment of a certain country in VWP, however, is not guaranteed 
for an indefinite period. Its participation is regularly reviewed (every two years)41, 
taking into consideration developments in each country, implications for US security 
(e.g. rate of admittance refusal at US ports of entry), law enforcement and citizenship 
issues and security of issuing passports. For instance the participation of Belgium 
has been under particular scrutiny because of the reported very high rate of stolen 
blank passports42. The Attorney-General can remove a country from the programme 
immediately (i.e. without previous review) in case of an overthrow of a democratically 
elected government, civil war, or sudden economic collapse. Such was the case of 
Argentina, which was removed from VWP in February 2002 due to the severe 
economic crisis in the country leading to indications that a substantial number of 
Argentine nationals would breach the 90-days visa waiver period43.  
 
The Visa Waiver Programme was also influenced by 9/11 developments, when 
especially some members of Congress called for its total elimination, pointing to 
potential threats to national security when certain terrorists could use this loophole 
and enter the United States without visas. This possibility could lead to very negative 
consequences for tourism and trade – before 9/11, short-term visitors to the United 
States from VWP countries, on average more than 15 million people a year, 
                                                 
41 The frequency of evaluation was brought down to 2 years by Enhanced Border Security Act; when enacted in 
2000 the programme provided for regular review every five years  
42 General Accounting Office: Border Security. Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Programme, 
November 2002, GAO-03-38, pg.  
43 Ibid 
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accounted for about 35% of all arrivals, and not counting arrivals from Canada and 
Mexico, as much as 68% of all overseas arrivals44. Also, the visitors from VWP 
countries tend to spend more than other visitors, and thus the consequences for US 
tourist industry could have be of an even greater order than the percentages would 
suggest. Last but not least, it was also underlined, not only by the General 
Accounting Office but also be the State Department, that re-introducing the visas 
could severely affect US relations with participating countries. It was reiterated that 
the countries on the programme contribute substantially to US efforts in fighting 
terrorism globally, e.g. by co-operating on anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq or by freezing terrorist assets. Last but not least, one also has to take into 
account the additional burden on US consular offices should the VWP be abolished. 
Given the high volume of arrivals to the US particularly from the visa waiver 
countries, the consular officers would have to process some extra 14 million visa 
applications annually, which would cause an initial increase of consular expenses 
ranging between 739 million USD to 1.28 billion USD depending on the percentage 
of visa applicants interviewed45, and the recurrent annual costs would be likely to 
range from 522 million to 810 million USD. It remains doubtful whether the State 
Department would have sufficient personal resources to cover the additional 
workload associated with the elimination of the programme. The additional burden 
associated with processing the applications would most likely lead to a diminished 
efficiency of visa clearing process, diminishing the time that can be spent on 
interviewing the applicants and drawing the attention of consular officers away from 
complicated cases that need more thorough review. Apart from this, the consular 
premises in many locations would have to be upgraded and expanded, which can 
also be a costly and time-consuming process.  
 
The other choice was to keep the programme in place but to insist on eliminating the 
loopholes that could enable terrorist and other suspects to enter the US through the 
programme. This basically led the US administration to insist on improved security of 
passports and travel documents issued by the participating countries. The US 
administration thus introduced deadlines for incorporation of certain security features 
of VWP countries, namely the incorporation of machine readable zones and biometric 
                                                 
44 Ibid, pg. 21 
45 Ibid, pg. 25 
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identifiers46. The deadlines were extended several times by the State Department as 
only a few countries in the Visa Waiver Program were able to meet the original 
deadlines set by the US administration, and there was a strong pressure to avoid 
negative consequences such as the disruption in international travel and business 
between the US and the EU and other visa waiver countries. One of the reasons why 
it was difficult to implement the introduction of biometrically enabled passports (or the 
so-called ePassports) was that there were not international technical standards 
agreed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to which the relevant 
US legislation was referring, and which would ensure interoperability of data carried 
on the storage media and of formats in which biometrics were contained.  For this 
reason, the representatives of the US, EU and other visa waiver countries met to 
agree on the minimum standards for biometric identifiers47. Eventually, the EU as a 
reaction to US requirements, in the view of enhancing the security features of its own 
travel documents and in the light of previously adopted measures48 decided to adopt 
a community legislation paving way for EU ePassports in December 200449.  
 
4.2. The European Union and its regulation of visa exemption – 
necessary consequence of the common visa policy 
 
Understandably, the need to commonly agree on a joint list of those countries whose 
nationals require visas and those who do not derives from the very nature of the 
common visa policy and from the Schengen acquis. If the policy of visa waivers were 
not applied uniformly among the member states, and still the EU wanted to achieve a 
system where the internal borders were lifted and persons moved among member 
                                                 
46 The deadline for issuing the passports with machine-readable zones was set to 26 June 2005. The deadline for 
passports to contain digital photographs was set at 26 October 2005. The deadline for introducing the biometric 
passports (also the so-called ePassports) was set at 26 October 2006.  
47 See US General Accounting Office report on the implications of eliminating Visa Waiver Programme, GAO-
03-38, www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/GAO-03-38, pg. 14 
48 See for instance Council Recommendation 98/C 140/02 of 28 May 1998 on the provision of forgery detection 
equipment at ports of entry to the European Union, Council Recommendation 99/C 140/01 of 29 April 1999 on 
the provision for the detection of false or falsified documents in the visa departments of representations abroad 
and in the offices of domestic authorities dealing with the issue of extension of visas, Joint Action 98/700/JHA 
of 3 December 1998 adopted on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty of European Union, concerning the setting 
up of a European Image Archiving System (FADO) 
49 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and 
biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States 
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states without being subject to border checks, it would be very easy to bypass the 
visa requirement simply by entering through a country not imposing visas.  
 
The list of countries to which the visa requirement will be applied is adopted as a 
Community act in the form of a Council Regulation.50 Generally, as well as in case of 
the US legislation, the decision whether the country is listed for visa waiver or not is 
determined on case by case basis and subject to joint agreement of the member 
states acting by qualified majority voting. The criteria determining whether the country 
will be placed on the visa waiver list (Annex II of the aforesaid regulation, commonly 
referred to as the “positive” or “white” list) or in Annex I listing countries requiring 
visas (the so-called “negative” or “black” list), are set in recital 5 of this regulation. 
Unlike in the United States, these criteria are defined much more vaguely as criteria 
relating to...”illegal immigration, public policy and security and to the European 
Union’s external relations with third countries, consideration also being given to the 
implications of regional coherence and reciprocity”. This reflects the complexity of the 
community decision making on visa issues where the due concerns of internal 
security of member states have to be balanced with the privileged treatment of 
certain countries based on historical, societal and cultural considerations of certain 
EU member states towards certain third countries or regions. The fact that a member 
state might be forced to apply visas to certain countries from which it did not require 
visas previously thus might seem as a necessary sacrifice to the facilitation of free 
movement of third country nationals across the EU, as the fellow member states 
might not share the same links and trust with the country at stake. These two lists are 
exhaustive, i.e. there is no “grey zone” which would enable the member states to 
decide whether they want to impose visas on certain countries or not.  
 
A significant difference from the United States is an explicit recognition of the role of 
the EU´s external relations with third countries. In the US there is at the moment no 
legislative recognition of the geo-strategic or foreign policy importance of countries 
being placed on the VWP, although in the ongoing discussions it is gaining some 
currency. On the contrary, in the EU there is no need to justify the designation of a 
                                                 
50 Council Regulation n. 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas 
when crossing the external borders of the member states and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement 
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certain country by reference to objective criteria (e.g. by measuring the visa refusal 
rate as in the US) or to perform a detailed examination or review of its law 
enforcement and passport issuing practices, although these criteria are implicitly 
included in the “public policy” and “security” criteria.  
 
Generally the countries placed in the “positive” list are developed countries (mainly 
European Economic Area and OECD members, Japan, South Korea, Singapore 
etc.), further countries that are at the verge of accession to the EU (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia) and most of the countries of Latin America. The overlap with the 
US Visa Waiver Programme is thus very partial – in fact only a few countries 
(Australia, Brunei, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the European 
microstates such as Andorra, San Marino and Monaco) feature on both the US and 
the EU “positive lists” (most of the countries on the US VWP are EU or Schengen 
members). The EU list is therefore wider and involves countries such as Israel or 
Mexico who for insurmountable security or immigration concerns in the US cannot be 
currently placed on the visa waver.  
 
Also, the EU lists are subject to periodical reviews of the justification of being placed 
in one of the annexes. The obvious, more technical reshuffling occurs with the EU 
enlargements, whereby the new member states are removed from Annex II, as the 
regulation does not apply to them any more (EU member states obviously must not 
apply visas to each other as this would be breach of freedom of movement and non-
discrimination in the EU embedded in the founding treaties). However, the Council 
periodically reviews51 these lists, which recently resulted e.g. in moving Ecuador52 
from the positive list to the negative one, or the most recent Commission proposal for 
another amendment, intending to impose a visa requirement on Bolivia and 
proposing a visa exemption for certain small island states, such as Bermuda, the 
Bahamas, Mauritius or the Seychelles53.  
 
A very important element in the EU visa waiver decision is the consideration of 
reciprocity. This draws on the assumption that once the EU places a country on a 
                                                 
51 Periodical review of both annexes was agreed at the Seville European Council in June 2002 
52 Regulation (EC) no. 453/2003 
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visa waiver list, that country is expected to lift the visas for all the EU members as 
well. The problem with this system is primarily that the EU is not always perceived by 
the third countries as a common area without internal borders, and the member 
states are thus, for visa purposes, treated separately. Originally, the EU Visa List 
Regulation required member states to notify the Commission and other member 
states whenever a third country introduced visas against it, enabling them to 
establish provisional visas for citizens of the third country, and subsequently for the 
Council to move this third country from the positive to the negative list. However, 
these situations were quite rare, and were more targeted at a possible future 
introduction of visa requirements vis-à-vis certain member states (such as if the US 
decided to abolish the VWP). The situation became more complicated with the 
accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries in May 2004, as these 
countries did not originally participate in the adoption of the visa regulation. 
Nevertheless they had to align their visa policy with the existing regulation, including 
lifting visas on certain countries or introducing visas on others54. The Hague 
programme of November 200455 mandated the Commission and the member states 
to work towards the removal of all non-reciprocity mechanisms in existence after 
accession. The new reciprocity mechanism, adopted by Council Regulation (EC) No 
851/2005 established an obligation for member states to notify all the existing non-
reciprocity situations to the Commission, which subsequently published them in a 
report56. The report reveals substantial progress in respect of most countries for 
which the non-reciprocity was notified, with concrete steps being taken to establish 
full reciprocity, which in many cases has been achieved. However, the report also 
spells out that in respect to three countries, there was no substantive progress in this 
respect – namely the United States, Canada and Australia.  
 
4.3. The US – EU visa non-reciprocity – central to the attention of 
the new member states 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
53 See the explanatory memorandum to the Commission proposal for the amendment to Regulation 539/2001, 
COM (2006) 84 of 13 July 2006 
54 On 1 May 2004, there were 112 cases of non-reciprocity reported towards the EU new member states 
55 A comprehensive five year EU programme for the policy of Freedom, Security and Justice (originally Justice 
and Home Affairs) adopted by the EU summit in the Hague, 4 – 5 November 2006 
56 COM (2006) 3 final of 10 January 2006 
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The non-reciprocity of the visa regime between the USA and certain EU member 
states has been one of the central points of the external dimension of EU visa policy 
and certainly one of the focal points in countries most affected by this asymmetry, i.e. 
the new member states of the EU. At the moment, the requirement of obtaining US 
non-immigrant visas applies to all the newly acceded countries apart from Slovenia 
(which was enrolled in the VWP in 1997). On the one hand, the new members could 
have expected EU accession to have been taken as a sign of their maturity and 
stability convincing the US administration of the futility of keeping existing visa 
requirements in place. Moreover, the new EU member states turned out to be very 
staunch supporters of some US policies, such as the global fight against terrorism, 
and they have contributed substantially to US-led efforts especially in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, often to a much larger degree than some of the countries currently on the 
visa waiver programme. However, as has been mentioned, geo-strategic or foreign 
policy considerations do not constitute formal criteria to determine whether a country 
should be eligible for the US visa waiver.  
The need to address this issue at a bilateral level as well as in the EU-US format has 
come up on various occasions. Whenever George W. Bush has made a visit to the 
region in recent years, the issue was raised by prime ministers or presidents - such 
was the case during the Bush-Putin summit hosted in Slovakia in February 2005 or 
during the visit to Hungary in June 2006 where the Hungarian President László 
Sólyom allegedly declined an invitation for an official visit to the US pending the lifting 
of US visas for Hungarians.  
 
The consequences of this controversy should not be underestimated for various 
reasons. Firstly, the US has in recent years been brought to kind of international 
isolation and for this reason the new member states are important for the US, 
politically and strategically. Secondly, regarding the visa issue, there is a robust 
consensus among the elites of CEE countries, including firm Atlanticists, that the 
current system is unjustified and discriminatory. With a little bit of licence, it may be 
referred to as the only substantial controversial issue in bilateral relations. Taking into 
account the US position, the arguments usually deployed are that the criteria for the 
admittance to the programme are strictly set by Congress and at the moment there is 
no will to relax them because of national security concerns. Although President Bush 
announced in February 2005 that the State Department will negotiate “roadmaps” 
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with nine countries to work out a way to the VWP, so far has been little to no 
progress. In fact, the road maps lack specificity, target dates and concrete 
benchmarks to measure the progress. This has even been recognized by the 
Commission, and at the EU-US summit in Vienna in June 2006 the Commission 
President Barroso addressed the issue again, suggesting that the lack of process 
could lead to retaliatory measures on part of the EU (such as the introduction of visas 
for certain categories of US citizens). 
 
In the US, however, these developments as well as diplomatic lobby of the new 
member states has precipitated a debate on the current criteria for the Visa Waver 
Programme. Some members of Congress as well as think-tanks57 argue that the 
criteria have to be modified, in order to take into account US foreign policy interests 
while reconciling the internal security concerns.  The only proposal currently on the 
table, however, does not seem to be the best solution. In May 2006, senator 
Santorum (Republican, Pennsylvania) tabled a proposal as part of the 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR) Act that would provisionally expand the 
Visa Waver Programme to countries on condition that they are members of the EU, 
do not pose threat to US national security (according to the avis of the Department of 
Homeland Security) and contribute at least a battalion (i.e. at least 300 troops) to US 
led operations in Iraq or in Afghanistan. Although it can be considered as a step in 
the right direction, it will certainly not solve the problem. Firstly, it is only Poland that 
would currently fulfil all the three criteria. Most of the other countries would probably 
not qualify, depending on the interpretation –although the Czech Republic deploys 
about 96 troops in Iraq and 220 in Afghanistan but about 100 of those in Afghanistan 
are part of the UN-led mission, not the US-led operation. If the visa is waived only for 
Poland, this would certainly not contribute to the objective of appeasing the other 
governments – as they would still view this as discrimination. One could for instance 
question whether by quantifying the extent of military support to the US smaller 
countries like Latvia or Lithuania are being discriminated against, as it is arguable 
more difficult for them to deploy the kind of forces that a large country like Poland 
can.. However, the amendment has not even been enacted, as it failed to win the 
                                                 
57 See for instance “Road Maps for Visa Waver Programme Lead Nowhere” or “With a Little Help from Our 
Friends: Enhancing Security by Expanding Visa Waver Programme” by James J. Carafano, the Heritage 
Foundation 
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approval of the House of Representatives and to be signed by the President. Another 
consideration which has often been raised in the region recently is a possible link 
with the US intention to ask one of the new member states (probably Poland or the 
Czech Republic) to locate the third US anti-missile base on their territory. In this 
respect, the political elites of countries under consideration would see the visa waiver 
as a necessary concession on part of the US, if creation of such a base were to be 
agreed. But as in the case of the Senate proposal mentioned, this would address the 
issue of visa waiver only for one or two countries and could lead to further frustration 
and deterioration of relations with other governments in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
The expansion of the VWP thus requires more thorough examination of the 
conditions of enrolment. Without question, none of the new EU member states poses 
a significant risk to US security in terms of terrorism, and certainly no more than 
some countries currently in the programme. Illegal immigration might be cause for 
more concern, but still not enough to justify the retention of visas. Firstly, much better 
mechanisms for tracking illegal residents through the US VISIT programme are now 
in place which apply to visa waiver countries, too. Secondly the migration flows from 
these countries are negligible compared to immigration pressures the US is facing 
from Mexico and other developing countries. Thirdly, further EU countries (such as 
Finland, Spain and Portugal) opened their labour markets in 2006 to the workers from 
new member states which would further diminish the incentive to work illegally in the 
US. In terms of the security of travel documents, all the new member states are 
bound by EU legislation, by virtue of which they are introducing ePassports, and due 
to the increased Community regulation of issues such as migration or border control 
they have to follow the EU-set standards as well as other countries on the VWP. 
There are sufficient guarantees in the Visa Waver Programme to terminate a 
country’s participation immediately should sudden problems (such as an increased 
number of illegal overstays) occur. The only criterion that the new member states 
currently do not meet, i.e. 3% refusal rate criterion, is a very subjective one and 
based on a discretionary judgement of consular officers and whether it is justified for 
further application is highly dubious.  
 
Therefore there does not seem to be a serious justification for not including the new 
EU member states as well as other countries (South Korea is often spelled out as a 
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prime example) in the VWP. The foreign policy impact of this move would be 
enormously beneficial both for the US and the EU and would comfortably supersede 
virtually unfounded internal security concerns in relation to the new EU member 
states.  
 
 4.4. European Union – easier access to citizens of neighbouring 
countries a top priority? 
 
Although it has been argued that the foreign policy aspect is somewhat neglected in 
the current US thinking on visa policy, the same could apply to the European Union. 
As has been mentioned, the EU when deciding to which countries it should apply 
visa restriction should inter alia take into consideration the EU external relations, 
including the implications for regional coherence and reciprocity. However, there is a 
certain discrepancy between the rhetoric and reality.  
 
The most striking example is the Union’s attitude to its neighbours. Without question, 
one of the aims of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was to give the EU´s 
neighbours, currently without the prospect of becoming members, a privileged status 
in EU external relations. Although the whole framework of this relatively new policy is 
still being created, the EU will not have the same kind of incentives available to exert 
its “soft” power over its neighbours as in the case of enlargement policy. One of the 
few tangible benefits that the EU can offer to citizens of neighbouring countries is an 
easier way to travel to the EU. This is not something to be underestimated – if the 
Union is to be taken by those citizens as a model, then it has to give them the 
possibility to experience the way EU works, especially for business and education 
purposes. Visa facilitation could thus be an extremely powerful tool in this respect. 
 
Another problem in EU visa policy towards neighbours stems from the effects of the 
2004 enlargement. Many neighbouring states such as Ukraine or Moldova enjoyed a 
privileged relationship with the new EU entrants, including visa free travel, which was 
important to maintaining existing close cultural, societal and also economic links. As 
a consequence of EU accession the new EU member states had to introduce visa 
restrictions for their Eastern neighbours because of the necessity to harmonise their 
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visa requirements with EU legislation, namely the “positive” and “negative” visa lists. 
However, due to the fact that the new EU members do not fully apply the common 
visa policy because they are not part of the Schengen zone, they still offer some 
privileges to citizens of neighbouring countries, including simplified visa clearance 
process or granting of visas for free58. For some countries, namely Poland (due to 
close links with Ukraine) and Hungary (close links with some of the Western Balkan 
countries, particularly Serbia, with a significant Hungarian minority) the visa policy 
constitutes an important element of their foreign policy leading to balanced and 
friendly relations with neighbouring countries. This advantage will disappear when the 
new member states join Schengen, (originally envisaged for the end of 2007 but now 
likely to be delayed by at least a year), when these countries will have to fully apply 
the existing acquis including standard Schengen visa fees and procedures. Given the 
high volume of travel between the EU Eastern neighbours and the new member 
states59, the disappearance of the existing privileges might make it even more difficult 
for the citizens of these countries to travel to the new member states.  
 
The short-term perspective of lifting the visas completely for EU neighbours seems to 
be unrealistic for the moment, because countries such as Ukraine, Moldova or the 
Western Balkan countries still have quite a high migration potential into the Union, 
and visa restrictions remain the way of controlling this process. Another reason why it 
is not possible to lift visas is the insufficient implementation of migration, border 
management and visa policies in the EU neighbouring countries themselves. The 
high rate of counterfeit travel document or identity card use remains a serious 
problem, despite the fact that the EU is pouring a lot of money (such as the CARDS 
programme for Western Balkan countries or TACIS for former Soviet Union) to 
improve the practices of issuing identity documents, as well as to improve border 
management. Trafficking in human beings and poor border control also pose serious 
problems for the EU´s immediate neighbours, and strengthening both technical and 
human resources at the borders, including technical equipment and training and 
deployment of additional staff in order to bring the neighbouring countries closer to 
                                                 
58 Poland and Hungary did not introduce  visa fees for citizens of Ukraine and Moldova even after EU accession. 
The Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic States lifted visa fees for citizens of Ukraine as a response to 
unilateral visa waiver of Ukraine to the citizens of all the EU member states in August 2005. Similarly, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia do not charge the visa fees to applicants of most countries of Western Balkans 
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EU standard, is a prerequisite for the eventual lifting of visas. However, many experts 
doubt that strict visa regimes can actually prevent the organized crime, trafficking in 
human beings etc. while they do make it extremely difficult for others to travel to the 
EU legally.  
 
But even without lifting the visa obligation for certain countries completely, it is still 
possible to make travel to the EU easier through the so-called “visa facilitation 
process”. This involves some categories of “wanted” travellers, such as students, 
researchers, school kids, journalists or businessmen by for example lifting visa fees, 
processing applications more quickly, simplifying the documents to be presented or 
exempting them from visa requirements completely. In contrast, the EU insists on 
concluding readmission agreements with countries to be considered for visa 
facilitation, enabling a swift repatriation of illegal immigrants, regardless of their 
nationality, who enter the EU (Schengen area) through the territory of neighbouring 
countries. 
 
There is still some inconsistency in the EU´s approach to visa facilitation. The first 
country to benefit from visa facilitation was Russia (October 2005), despite the fact 
that it does not fall under the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Ukraine started visa facilitation talks in November 2005. In contrast, the countries of 
Western Balkans (who are not part of the ENP, either but have been repeatedly 
recognized as candidates for EU membership)60 have not started visa facilitation 
talks at all, and they do not even have a roadmap, despite certain moves in the 
Commission to prepare the strategy61. The Commission, which can negotiate 
readmission agreements, has also not taken any steps to do so with Western Balkan 
countries except for Albania. A recent report of the International Crisis Group points 
to the fact that about 70% of university students in Serbia have never travelled 
outside the country62. This certainly does not contribute to the positive image of the 
EU in the region, and substantially limits the EU´s impact on developments there. 
The very stringent conditions imposed on visa applicants lead to a sense of isolation 
                                                                                                                                                        
59 For instance in 2004 Polish consulates in Ukraine issued about 575,000 visas whilst German consulates only 
about 123,000 visas  
60 See for example European Council Conclusions of Santa Maria da Feira (2000) or Thessaloniki (2003) 
61 Commission decided in May 2006 to propose to the Council to authorise the start of visa facilitation 
agreement with Macedonia 
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generally felt in EU-neighbouring countries, and the idea of a new “paper” curtain 
emerging across Europe, dividing the EU from the rest of the continent, seriously 
undermines the effectiveness of the EU-policy of soft power and inclusion.  
 
Another way of mitigating the enlargement effect on EU visa policy is the 
Commission proposal for the regulation of local border traffic at the future EU 
external border.63 Some of the member states have local border traffic systems in 
place; however, no EU-wide measure has been adopted so far. The intention is to 
give easier access to the residents of regions outside the EU, but situated on its 
external border64 to adjacent border regions in the EU, by issuing a special type of 
visa (the so-called “L” visa) with limited territorial validity which will be free of charge 
or less costly, will be issued for a period of one to five years and will entitle its bearer 
to multiple crossings to the issuing country for a maximum period of seven days for 
up to three months altogether within each half a year of the visa validity.65 
Additionally, the applicants would not have to prove adequate financial subsistence 
for obtaining this kind of visa. Undoubtedly this is another positive step in the right 
direction which should make it easier for certain categories of regular visitors 
(“commuters”) to travel to the EU. But the question remains whether the regulation of 
local border traffic regime is going to make much difference. Firstly, it applies only to 
the residents of the border regions as defined in the proposal, and enables them to 
travel only to the same border regions on part of the EU territory. For instance in the 
case of Ukraine, the only large town a sufficient distance from the border is Uzhorod, 
so the number of people who could benefit from this regime remains rather limited.66 
Secondly, the proposal is still in the legislative process and is moving forward slowly, 
so there is a risk that it will not even be adopted before the new member states join 
Schengen. There is also no guarantee that the visas will be free or available at a 
reduced cost – this is left at the discretion of member states. All in all, the relaxation 
of travel restrictions for local border traffic will not solve the problems of citizens of 
neighbouring countries hoping to travel to the EU without hindrance. .  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
62 International Crisis Group: EU Visas and Western Balkans. Europe Report No 168, 29 November 2005 
63 COM(2003) 202 of 14 August 2003 
64 Border areas are defined in the proposal as areas extending up to 50 km from the external border 
65 Ibid 
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5. Effectiveness of current US and EU visa policies – do not 
forget about the applicants 
 
Visa policy is a traditional way of maintaining control over the internal security of a 
country by regulating its contact with the citizens of foreign countries. Both the US 
and the EU are aware that the visa process should not, in theory, hinder the 
legitimate rights of third country nationals wishing to enter their territories for lawful 
and legitimate purposes, such as business, education, cultural relations or tourism. 
However, the practice shows that this is not always the case. US or EU citizens as 
well as the policymakers, who generally do not have to undergo visa procedures as 
most of them can travel freely around the world, can hardly imagine the obstacles 
that visa applicants – most of them law abiding citizens posing no security threat – 
have to undergo whenever they want to travel to the EU or the US. The internal 
security concerns and foreign policy considerations have overshadowed the human 
dimension of visa policy and its impact on people for whom the visa process 
determines the first impression on the country they are intending to visit. 
 
5.1. Visa and related costs  
 
The first non-negligible obstacle relating to acquisition of visas are the costs incurred. 
This does not relate only to cost of the visas themselves but to costs of travel to the 
consular location (sometimes required several times), salary lost, and costs of all the 
supporting documentation which normally has to be translated to the official language 
of the visa issuing country.   
The harmonised cost of the basic US non-immigrant (visitor) visa (B-type)67 around 
the world is 100 USD. This seems to be quite a high amount but the State 
Department officials argue that it is a multiple-entry visa with a long validity, issued 
for most countries for a period of five to ten years68 which enables repeated travel to 
the US for up to three months over this period. It is also argued that the visa fee 
helps to maintain a dense network of US consulates, and a huge increase in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
66 Boratyński J., Gromadzki G., Sushko O.: How to Make a Difference? EU-Ukrainian Negotiations on 
Facilitation of Visa Regime. Stefan Batory Foundation, October 2005 
67 For more detailed classification of the US non-immigrant visas, refer to US Citizenship and Immigration 
Services in the Department of Homeland Security 
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demand for US visas has forced the administration to open representations in new 
locations, especially in India69. On the other hand, the fact that visa restrictions apply 
mostly to citizens of developing countries makes it much more difficult for these 
individuals to travel to the US as this amount is still comparable to or exceeds 
average monthly salary, and moreover is non-refundable. If one adds the necessity of 
enclosing a bank statement proving that the applicant has sufficient funds on the 
account, in many cases obtaining the visas becomes virtually impossible.  
 
The cost of a short-term Schengen visa is currently 35 €. However, a recent political 
decision of the Council decided to raise the standard fee charged to Schengen visas 
to 60 €70 as of 1 January 2007. This decision is a reaction to the French proposal 
arguing that the cost of visa processing will increase due to the creation of Visa 
Information System and the obligation of consular offices to collect and process 
biometric identifiers. But a number of member states would be opposed to an en bloc 
increase of Schengen visas, which would clearly run counter to the external policy 
objectives of the EU, if no compensatory measures were agreed. Thus, the political 
agreement also involves an extended scope of granting visa fee waivers71. Also the 
increased fee will not apply to countries that have concluded or are in process of 
negotiating visa facilitation agreements. This still would not apply to many EU 
neighbouring countries who would be most affected by the increased visa fee 
(currently only Russia and Ukraine are negotiating or have concluded such 
agreements). The Council has therefore invited the Commission to bring forward the 
mandate to start negotiating such agreements with the countries of Western Balkans. 
This would still leave the poorest countries of the continent, i.e. Moldova72 or the 
South Caucasus countries (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) subject to this increased 
visa fee if no decision to start visa facilitation talks is taken by 1 January 2007.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
68 “Breaking the Visa Backlog” Interview with Tony Edson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for visa services at the 
State Department, Business Week Online, 24 April 2006 
69 Ibid 
70 Council of the EU, Press Release, 27-28 April 2006, 8402/06 (Presse 106) 
71 Ibid. The visa fee waivers would include children under 6 years, school pupils and students on school 
excursions, researchers and ad hoc waivers that can be granted by individual member states for the purposes of 
promoting cultural, foreign policy, development policy interests or for humanitarian reasons 
72 In relation to Moldova, Commission was mandated to undertake preliminary consultations with member states 
on the feasibility of visa facilitation. The Commission will present its report prior to the October 2006 meeting of 
Justice and Home Affairs Council  
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Both the US and the EU do not generally apply visas to rich or developed countries 
while they do so in respect to most of the developing, and therefore much poorer 
countries. Although visa fees might not seem too high by Western standards and 
which might reflect the costs incurred by consular offices, it begs the question 
whether the system as it stands is fundamentally unjust. The recent EU decision 
referred to goes exactly in the direction of shifting the burden for increased visa 
issuance costs, introduced primarily because of the West’s own concerns of its 
internal security, towards poor third world countries, creating further deterrents to 
legitimate travel and making it more difficult for many citizens of developing countries 
to interact with liberal developed western societies. Some studies demonstrate the 
absurdity of this system. For instance the Macedonian citizens are estimated to 
spend as much as 10 million € a year on EU visas which accounts to as much as one 
third of the overall assistance the EU has pledged to Macedonia under the CARDS 
programme for 2005. Thus, this assistance money can, therefore, basically be seen 
as reverting to the pockets of EU governments73.  
5.2. Additional costs, absence of firm rules and complicated 
procedures 
 
For US visas, the visa fee itself is one of the few direct costs incurred by applicants 
because consular officials require very little other official documentation. The process 
of applying for visas is available on the websites of the State Department74, 
Department of Homeland Security, on a special website devoted to travel to the US75 
and on the websites of the embassies and consular representations in most 
locations. So finding the necessary information is quite easy, as it is also often 
available in the local language. The main challenge that the US consulates had to 
tackle in the post 9/11 period was the introduction of compulsory interviewing of all 
the visa applicants, tougher screening process for Mantis and Condor visa checks as 
well as tougher inter-agency review of applicants (which has been described in more 
detail above) and taking biometric identifiers which has led to significant delays in 
some locations. While the administration managed to significantly speed up the inter-
agency review process and the average clearance of Visa Mantis is now even 
                                                 
73 http://www.worldpress.org/print_article.cfm?article_id=2339&dont=yes 
74 www.UnitedStatesVisas.gov 
75 Destination USA: Secure Borders, Open Doors 
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quicker than before 9/1176, the interviews still remain the main problem in some 
places where there is a huge demand for visas. While normally it takes only a few 
days to set up an interview with US consular officials in most places in Europe, for 
example in India an applicant has to wait for an average of 189 days in Chennai and 
170 days in Mumbai77. In Havana, the official reported time for setting up an interview 
is 538 days. But it seems that the State Department is making an effort to react to 
this situation quickly, e.g. by extending the premises in certain highly exposed posts 
(Mumbai) or opening the consulates in new locations (Hyderabad).  
 
It is still not such an easy job to obtain a visa for the EU countries, even for the 
Schengen area. Firstly, the consular practices of different member states differ 
significantly. There are some minimum requirements on the documentation 
supporting the application, but some consulates might require other supporting 
documents such as those proving the purpose of a journey (letter of invitation, 
organised trip voucher etc.), travel arrangements (plane ticket, car documents), 
means of subsistence, proof of accommodation, proof of residence and links to the 
country of residence (such as real estate certificates) or proof of professional and 
social status78. Very much is left to the discretion of consular officers and established 
practice in each consular location and the overall number of supporting documents 
can be huge.  Despite the fact that all these documents are intended for the consular 
officials to make a judgement whether an applicant constitutes a risk of breaching 
immigration laws, national interest or security, it is highly doubtful whether such an 
extensive list is necessary to determine the admissibility of applicants to the EU. The 
cost of having the documents translated further increases the cost of application. 
Moreover, the list of required supporting documents is often not firmly established 
and not readily available as the recent report of the Batory Foundation points out79, 
so it often leads to applicants being asked to supply additional documents which 
might lead to repeated trips to the consular offices. Unlike in the US, there is no 
Commission-run portal serving as a gateway for the applicants to learn about the 
process of applying for Schengen and other EU visas. The information available at 
                                                 
76 “Breaking the Visa Backlog” Interview with Tony Edson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for visa services at the 
State Department, Business Week Online, 24 April 2006 
77 www.state.gov 
78 See Common Consular Instructions, Chapter V: Examination of Applications and Decisions Taken 
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the Commission website is far from being user-friendly and is often not even updated. 
The interactive portal MediaVisa.net is a private initiative, and one would certainly 
assume that such information should be made available at the official websites of 
European institutions, with possible links to the relevant national consular 
representations.  
 
Needless to say, complicated, non-transparent procedures required by certain 
consulates leading the applicants to frustration over the whole process become a 
feeding ground for corruption and emergence of all kinds of suspicious “service 
providers” who collect additional fees from the applicants to manage the visas for 
them. These services might relate to the assistance with filling the visa application, 
translating additional documents or avoiding the queues, or placing on a waiting list 
with a place guaranteed. Obviously all this is provided for an additional fee the cost of 
which can go up to 100 €80, and creates an extra burden, as many of the applicants 
prefer to pay this extra amount to make sure that they will get the application right. 
The presence of these intermediaries often gives ground to doubts about the attitude 
of consular staff and their inclination to bribery. Such was the case of the widely 
publicised scandal at the German embassy in Kyiv which enabled many applicants to 
get the visas without sufficient review81. Other cases involve the French Consulate in 
Sofia selling an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 visas to Bulgarian prostitutes82 or the 
Belgian Embassy in the same location accepting bribes or using front companies 
making fictitious requests for visas.83  These revelations lead to serious questions 
about the credibility of the EU policy in the neighbouring countries – while the EU is 
striving to promote transparency and good governance in the neighbouring countries, 
its own officials are implicated in corruption in the visa issuance process. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
79 Visa Policies of European Union Member States. Monitoring Report, Stefan Batory Foundation. Warsaw, June 
2006 
80 The report of the Batory Foundation points to the cases of the waiting list “manager” at the French consulate in 
Minsk, charging between 30 to 100 € for placing people on the top of the waiting list, or a Polish consulate in 
Kyiv charging 30 € for a swift, three-hour visa procedure 
81 This was enabled on the basis of the so-called “Volmer” decree. This internal instruction was issued as a 
reaction to complaints that visa issuance at German embassies was too strict, and so the consular officials were 
supposed to decide in favour of applicants when in doubt. This has led to a huge number of visas issued 
particularly in Kyiv where many visas were issued to prostitutes, human traffickers and members of criminal 
networks. For more info see for example http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1495078,00.html 
82 International Crisis Group: EU Visas and Western Balkans. Europe Report No 168, 29 November 2005, pg. 12 
83 Scandal Hangs over Belgium’s EU Presidency, Telegraph, 27 June 2001 
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5.3. Accessibility of consulates 
 
An important element to bear in mind is that applicants often have to travel a long 
way to lodge their application. Particularly for geographically large countries such as 
Ukraine, Russia or Turkey, this can be an additional hindrance especially if more 
visits to the embassy are required. The situation should generally be made easier 
with the Schengen visas which enables applicants to lodge their applications at a 
designated representation of another member state where the destination country 
does not have a consulate in the relevant location84 which can then in principle issue 
visas on behalf of the destination state (the principle of representation). However, the 
principle of representation is not automatic in the current system (apart from the 
Benelux countries) and is subject to prior arrangements among them85. If an 
agreement on representation is not made, applicants have to travel to another 
country which has the appropriate consular facilities of the country of destination.  
Where that country itself imposes visa restrictions against the applicant, this means, 
quite apart from the other expenses attendant on travel, having to get a visa to apply 
for a visa. Moreover, the fact that not all the EU members are in Schengen yet make 
things even worse as those outside the system have not made arrangements on 
mutual representation on accepting visa applications like in the Schengen system.  If 
we take for instance the example of Moldova, only a very few member states have 
representation there. For instance, if a Moldovan citizen wants to travel to Slovenia or 
Cyprus, he or she has to travel to the consulate with territorial jurisdiction in Budapest 
which is about 1000 km from Chisinau, and moreover an applicant has to acquire 
Hungarian visas first. For other destinations they have to travel either to Bucharest 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and 
Sweden), Kyiv (Latvia, Lithuania, Greece and the Netherlands) or even Moscow 
(Malta)86. A Georgian applicant to travel to Hungary, has first to travel to Kyiv,  or a 
Macedonian or Bosnian applicant for a Czech or Slovak visa has to travel to Sofia 
and Belgrade respectively (despite the fact that he or she then gets the visas for 
free). Many other examples like this could be identified in Europe due to the 
continued existence of the two-step approach to Schengen. Thus a swift expansion 
                                                 
84 For the list of representing countries, see Annex 18 to Common Consular Instructions 
85 See the Common Consular Instructions, Point II.1.2 
86 Ibid, pg. 19 
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of Schengen to include the new member states would surely make things easier for 
many applicants from Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR wishing to travel to some of 
the EU member states, despite the fact that they might lose some privileges (such as 
free visas for some new EU member states). One of the tangible results that should 
make things easier for travellers to the Schengen countries is the recent decision to 
allow transit through the non-Schengen countries (i.e. the new member states of the 
EU) for holders of valid Schengen visas for up to 5 days.  
 
A further complication that might arise is the necessity to appear in person for the first 
time at the consulate because of need to capture biometric data. Until now, the 
Common Consular Instructions provided for the possibility of submitting the 
application through a travel agency or a commercial intermediary (in case of an 
organized trip for instance) which is used to a varying degree in different countries. 
But now all the applicants will have to appear in person at the consulate at least for 
the first time for the officials to capture their biometric data87 which might cause 
further pressure on the capacities of consular premises, longer waiting times and less 
comfortable conditions.  This can be particularly difficult for large countries where 
travelling to a consular location might prove extremely difficult for applicants. In this 
respect, the provision in the Common Consular Instructions relating to the possibility 
of outsourcing the capture of biometric might provide the right solution. 
 
 
6. Key points as a conclusion 
 
The visa policy requires the United States and the EU to balance delicately between 
the internal security considerations, foreign policy goals and issues concerning 
human rights of the visa applicants. Striking the right balance between the three 
priorities that the visa policy should ideally meet, however, turned out to be 
increasingly difficult in post 9/11 environment, when the internal security 
                                                 
87 According to the current proposal amending the CCI, the biometric identifiers will be retained for five years, 
so it will not be necessary to make repeated visits to the consulate during a 4-year period from the first 
submission of the application  if the local consular practice provides for the possibility of submitting visa 
applications through travel agencies or commercial intermediaries  
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considerations tend to prevail, often without sufficient justification or adjustment 
concerning the other priorities. 
Increased concerns over security of visa issuing have led to complicated and more 
costly procedures being introduced in both the US and the EU. Although they can 
help to meet the legitimate security concerns of both parties, they can make lives 
more complicated for the visa applicants, and can result in more alienation of the 
citizens of the countries to whom the visas restrictions apply. They can also have 
significant impact on tourism and trade. For this reason, both the EU and the US 
should work towards a more balanced approach to the visa issuing process which 
would satisfy the internal security concerns and the legitimate right to travel, be it for 
tourism and business, as well as foreign policy goals of both the EU and the US.  
Also, it has to be taken into consideration that visa policy is still closely interlinked 
with the foreign policy objectives of both the EU and the US and can have a 
significant impact on their relations with third countries. Lifting or facilitating the visa 
requirements does not necessarily have to mean diminished control of these entities 
concerning migration flows or preventing illegal perpetrations by terrorist or others 
who pose a threat to national security. Those countries should adjust the visa policy 
to the challenges of the 21st century by excluding some absurd cases that have 
appeared in the visa procedures. This would help greatly to approving the relations 
with countries who can be considered as important partners, work towards improving 
of the image of both the US and the EU in these countries, and sending a gesture of 
goodwill to those of their citizens who wish to travel there for legitimate and lawful 
purposes.  
 
Key recommendations: 
 
• The enrolment of new biometric identifiers of the visa applicants should be 
made subject to strict data privacy rules in order to limit possible abuse as 
much as possible, especially with regard to the fact that the biometric 
technology is relatively new, and new ways of abusing it can emerge. The visa 
applicants should have sufficient remedies to rectify information which is 
incorrect.  
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• Interoperability of databases containing data of visa applicants with other law 
enforcement databases in both the US and the EU is important for internal 
security reasons, especially for tracking illegal and criminal activities. 
However, the access of other law enforcement agencies to information on visa 
applicants should be granted only in justified cases and not routinely.  
 
• The visa applicants should not bear the costs of technology which is required 
in connection with the enrolment of biometric identifiers. Therefore, the 
increase in visa fees should not be justified by the use of new technologies. If 
so, the costs should be borne by the rich countries. 
 
• The EU should look for ways of making the visa issuance process more 
effective. The possibility of setting up Common Application Centres is a good 
way forward, but still more could be done in terms of more effective use of 
human resources by setting up genuine EU consulates where the applicants 
could apply for any EU (or at least a Schengen) visa. This could prevent the 
cost of Schengen visas going up and simplify the work of the Visa Information 
System. Those countries who would be willing to issue joint visas could 
explore the mechanism of enhanced co-operation in the existing treaties to 
move ahead with joint consular facilities. 
 
• The US Visa Waiver Programme should be expanded to those countries that 
recently joined the European Union, and other countries that do not pose any 
national security threat to the United States, such as South Korea. In the event 
that the swift expansion of the VWP is not feasible, an intermediate measure 
such as visa facilitation, opening up an easier way for citizens of these 
countries to travel to the US, should be considered.  
 
• The EU visa facilitation process must take into account the external dimension 
of EU activities. Facilitating the travel between the EU and the neighbouring 
countries, either with a European perspective (Western Balkans) or where the 
EU is involved in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy should 
be a top priority, providing that the countries at stake improve their conditions 
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of border management, passport security and visa issuance. EU technical 
assistance in these respects should be a key component of European 
Neighbourhood Action Plans in the area of Justice and Home Affairs and in 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreements.  
 
 
 
 
 
